Is the EU like the Qwerty keyboard?

I ask because back in 1985 Paul David wrote a paper (pdf) in which he claimed that the Qwerty keyboard was inferior to alternatives such as the Dvorak one. However, the Qwerty keyboard was adopted for reasons which aren't relevant today - for example, in slowing typists down it reduced the frequency with which typewriter keys collided with each other. And it persists because the short-run costs of becoming accustomed to a new keyboard deter us from shifting despite the long-term advantages of doing so.

Although some people quibble with David's example - it's unclear whether Dvorak keyboards are actually better - the general story here is plausible. We can become locked into inferior (pdf) technologies which were first adopted by historical accident because the costs of switching to better alternatives are high. Robin Cowan claims (pdf) that this is the case with nuclear power plants in the US*.

Now, here's the thing. If Brexit's intelligent advocates are right, the same thing is true for the EU. They argue that our relationship with the EU is sub-optimal and might become more so and that we'd be better off (pdf) with globally free trade. However, there are short-term costs to shifting: the uncertainty caused by Brexit could dampen investment both directly and, perhaps, by raising borrowing costs.

In this sense, the EU is like the Qwerty keyboard; it's inefficient, but we're locked in by historical accident and the short-term costs of changing.

Which poses the question: are those short-term costs worth incurring? My hunch is no (pdf). Even if we achieved good free trade agreements, it would take many years to reap the benefits of them simply because companies would have to invest in export sales efforts in unfamiliar parts of the world, thus overcoming the force of gravity. Dietz Vollrath's general point - that it takes many years for improvements in potential GDP to feed into actual GDP - applies especially here.

I fear, therefore, that Brexit's advocates are under-estimating the costs of adjustment.

They've got form for doing so. Back in 1984 Patrick Minford argued in favour of pit closures on the grounds that unemployed miners would find work elsewhere - that the adjustment process would be swift enough to more than offset the short-term hardship. He was wrong: ex-mining communities are still depressed.

And here's my suspicion. Perhaps in supporting Brexit free marketeers are making a mistake they often make: they under-estimate how slow and costly the transitions can be from one equilibrium to another.

* My favourite example is Brian Arthur's story of how steam-powered cars were hard hit by an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 1914 which closed the water troughs from which they refuelled, thus locking us into petrol engines.